Assess quantum-related technology risk within the institution's existing ICT, cybersecurity and operational resilience framework. Identify material exposures, business impact and risk treatment options.
Post-Quantum Cryptography
Quantum Readiness for the UAE Financial Sector.
The practical starting point is a complete cryptographic inventory, linked to data sensitivity, business ownership, crypto-agility and third-party dependencies, not simply a list of certificates.
Operational resilience meets quantum readiness.
Operational resilience and ICT cybersecurity requirements for Licensed Financial Institutions, effective 14 September 2026.
CBUAE Regulation C 1/2026
Operational Risk and Operational Resilience
Four areas to address
Select an area to exploreIdentify and classify cryptographic assets across systems, applications, networks, HSMs, cloud services and third parties. Map ownership, sensitivity, dependencies and crypto-agility.
Define phased migration options for priority assets, including crypto-agility improvements, hybrid approaches and technology refresh dependencies.
Keep emerging technology and quantum-related cyber risk within information security and operational resilience governance, with appropriate senior management and board visibility.
A complete cryptographic inventory linked to data sensitivity, business ownership, crypto-agility and third-party dependencies — not simply a list of certificates.
Harvest now.
Decrypt later.
Sensitive encrypted traffic may be captured today and potentially decrypted later if future quantum capabilities break the public-key mechanisms protecting it.
The risk begins before a quantum computer exists.
Adversaries do not need a quantum computer to start — they need storage. And storage is cheap!
Captured traffic keeps its value for as long as the data inside it matters: account data, customer identity, interbank messages, board communications.
NIST deprecates RSA and ECC in 2030 and disallows them in 2035. Data with a confidentiality life beyond that horizon is exposed today (Mosca’s inequality).
Symmetric encryption (AES-256) is fine. The weak link is the key exchange that protects it.
A practical step toward quantum-resistant confidentiality.
TLS 1.3 with hybrid key exchange — X25519 + ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203).
Supported today by OpenSSL 3.5+, Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Safari, Cloudflare, AWS and Azure front doors. No certificate change required.
Hybrid means classical security is never weaker than before, and quantum security is added — the safe default while ML-DSA certificates mature.
Priority order: internet edge, interbank and payment links, VPNs, then internal east-west.
A staged transition: Hybrid key exchange can address confidentiality exposure sooner, while certificate and digital-signature migration should be treated as a longer, staged programme.
Reference: NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography programme and transition guidance, 2025–2026. Statements reproduced from the supplied presentation; validate technical support and standards timelines before publication.
What changes on the wire.
Three technical notes before you plan
Post-quantum certificates are bigger, encodings are evolving, and TLS 1.3 changed what a passive sensor can see. Select a topic below to explore the implications for cryptographic discovery and migration.
01 / Payload impact
ML-DSA certificates are heavier
A certificate signed with ML-DSA-44 carries about 3.35× the bytes of today’s ECDSA equivalent; ML-DSA-65 and -87 more. Handshakes cross the TCP initial window, TLS record limits and some middleboxes. Plan capacity on edge devices, HSM throughput and constrained clients before switching issuance.
02 / Encoding efficiency
C509: CBOR-encoded X.509
IETF (COSE working group) defines a compact CBOR encoding of X.509 certificates — C509 — that strips the ASN.1/DER overhead and shrinks classical certificates substantially. For ML-DSA the public key and signature dominate, so C509 helps at the margin, not at the core. Track it for IoT and constrained links.
03 / Sensor visibility
TLS 1.3 hides the certificate
In TLS 1.3 the server certificate is sent encrypted. A passive sensor sees only ClientHello and ServerHello: SNI, offered and selected key-exchange groups. Products built on passive certificate capture — ISARA, CryptoNext and similar — go blind on modern endpoints. That is why our inventory pairs active scanning with ntopng flow visibility rather than relying on passive certificate extraction.
Cryptographic asset inventory
Three layers,
One cryptographic register.
Build the baseline first. Reconcile what is discovered, what has been issued, and what is observed in traffic — so completeness is measured, not assumed.
rTrust CLM Core — active network scanning, TLS versions, certificate chains, key algorithms and hybrid key-exchange support.
Join the register to CMDB and data classification, sensitivity, data lifetime and ownership.
One register with owner, algorithm, protocol, PQC readiness and counterparties per asset — plus a repeatable procedure and measurable coverage metric.
Our solution / Certificate lifecycle management
rTrust CLM Core.
Inventory. Governance. Automation.
Centralised control of every certificate, decentralized issuance for the teams that need them.
Discovery
Network scanning, Certificate Transparency, smart discovery across cloud, containers, appliances and IoT.
X.509 v3 · CRLv2 · RFC 5280 · FIPS 204 ML-DSA today · RPM, Docker or Kubernetes · full REST API · Bouncy Castle cryptography.
Seen in the product
Hybrid TLS and ML-DSA certificates, in one inventory.
Illustrative live records from rTrust CLM Core, September 2026. Explore the inventory, two certificate examples and the dynamic dashboard.
One host. Multiple endpoints.
Network inventory with TLS context, hybrid key exchange and first-seen / last-seen evidence.
Classical signature. PQC-ready host.
A public ECDSA P-256 certificate marked Host PQC Ready.
ML-DSA, already in the inventory.
Post-quantum key and signature details, with issuance and grading handled by the same inventory.
A dynamic certificate dashboard.
Explore the report dimensions from the presentation. The chart below is schematic, not real certificate counts.
Inventory view: rn-trust.com on ports 443, 2083 and 8443 — TLS 1.3 and 1.2, hybrid key exchange negotiated. First seen / last seen provide the audit trail.
Partner · Network Visibility
ntopng with nProbe.
See the connections.
Open-source traffic analysis with commercial collection and support — the observed layer of your cryptographic inventory. Map third-party dependencies, verify scan coverage and add network visibility to PQC readiness.
Flow records identify communicating endpoints, connections and third-party dependencies.
Reconcile flow-observed TLS servers with assets discovered by rTrust CLM Core active scans.
Servers appearing in flows but absent from the scan identify gaps to investigate. Record the result as coverage evidence.
Packet-level visibility at selected network points provides access to handshake metadata unavailable in basic NetFlow records.
Session context includes TLS version, SNI, cipher, ALPN and fingerprints. Zeek ssl.log provides negotiated key-exchange-group evidence.
Active scanning supplies authoritative certificate, algorithm and hybrid-key-exchange attributes for the cryptographic inventory.
Third-party dependency mapping
Every encrypted flow to a SaaS provider, cloud region, card network or correspondent bank becomes a third-party dependency that can be named, counted and dated.
nDPI classifies 450+ applications. nProbe collects NetFlow v5/v9, IPFIX and sFlow from routers, firewalls and switches into one view.
nProbe sensors per site and cloud packet mirroring across AWS, Azure and GCP feed central ntopng through ZMQ or Kafka.
Delivered under the MSP contract, licensed, supported and patched, providing an operational counterpart for the bank's third-party risk team.
NetFlow records alone do not contain TLS certificate or handshake metadata. Packet sensors, Zeek and active scanning complement the dependency map to create a more complete cryptographic inventory.
Passive monitoring / network architecture
The network architecture challenge.
Where to look, with what, and what each vantage point can and cannot see. Explore the three collection methods, then see how they work together in the recommended deployment.
Core principle: a few selected packet sensors, broad flow export and active scanning provide complementary evidence.
Illustrative vantage points — the selected method lights up its telemetry path
SPAN / Mirror Ports
Cheapest and fastest; sees full packets on the local switch.
Misses traffic on other switches and VLANs; can drop under load; sees only one hop.
Recommended vantage: Internet edge, DMZ, DC core
Three evidence layers. One complete picture.
Key architectural decision: you do not need to TAP everything. Flows establish the map, selected sensors provide handshake context, and active scans confirm cryptographic attributes.
Completing the inventory
What the network cannot see and how we close it.
A bank's cryptography is not only on the wire. Six categories need a different source.
CATEGORY 01 / 06
HSM and KMS keys
Payment, PIN, EMV, SWIFT, 3-D Secure, cloud KMS, TDE and tokenisation keys.
Partition and KMS exports.
Illustrative source reconciliation, not a claim of automatic extraction.
Open to demo / RNTrust infrastructure
What we can show you today.
Everything on this slide runs on our own infrastructure — no slideware. Explore six demonstrations that turn quantum readiness into practical evidence.
Live discovery
Scan a range you name, watch endpoints, TLS versions and hybrid key-exchange support populate the inventory.
Produce a reusable cryptographic asset register and coverage methodology for the wider organisation.
Questions / Next steps
Trust is not decreed, it's built.
RNTrust — The Digital Trust Company
Dubai · Abu Dhabi · Paris · Belgrade
Exploring priority 01 of 04